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The dominant literature on Cambodian politics over the past two decades has suggested a 
mixture of elite and mass clientelism enabled the hegemonic Cambodian People’s Party to rule 
via competitive but authoritarian elections, while lessening its previous reliance on repression 
and violence. Such explanations did not predict the upswing in contestation in the country in 
2013 and thereafter. Neither do they account for the crackdown that followed. Following 
literature that draws attention to the tensions in building and maintaining political coalitions 
under authoritarianism, and demonstrating the difficulties in maintaining competitive 
authoritarianism over time, this article draws attention to structural, institutional and 
distributional impediments to the CPP leadership in building and maintaining effective 
reciprocal relations with their electoral clients while simultaneously balancing the interests of 
the military and other elites at the core of the regime. To make its argument, the article compares 
weaknesses in the CPP’s electoral clientelism with the effectiveness of patronage within the 
security forces, seen through the lens of Cambodia’s experience of land dispossession. It shows 
that an extractive and exclusive political economy privileged the interests of regime insiders 
over potential mass electoral clients precisely during the same period the CPP was supposed to 
be securing its hold on power via mass electoral clientelism. This further explains why the 
regime fell back on repression over reform in response to the upswing in contestation manifest 
from 2013, and why, despite the failings of its mass patronage project, repression has 
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On July 27, 2013, despite widespread irregularities and an electoral landscape heavily favouring 
the incumbent Cambodian People’s Party (CPP),1 it nearly lost those highly contested national 
elections, the fifth since these were reintroduced by the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993. The CPP claimed 49% of the votes compared to 44% for the 
Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), a united opposition which had formed from the 
merger of the Sam Rainsy Party and Human Rights Party (HRP) in 2012. The result in 2013 
came as a surprise to many observers of Cambodian politics, and to the CPP itself.2 
The resurgence of an opposition able to challenge the CPP during national elections in 2013 
and capable of mobilising people on the street in its aftermath, then significantly growing its 
vote in rural areas in commune elections in 2017, demonstrated the limits of the dominant 
explanations of Cambodia’s politics. These put a premium on electoral clientelism for regime 
durability and claimed that the CPP had turned away from relying on fear and repression as it 
had done between 1993 and 1998,3 to a system of rule based on mass patronage politics 
delivering stable competitive electoral authoritarianism.  
This article argues that the focus on mass-party patronage and electoral clientelism delivering 
competitive election victories has been overemphasised in the literature on Cambodia. 4 It 
presents a new analysis of challenges to building and sustaining competitive authoritarianism 
and suggests renewed attention should be paid to the coercion underpinning CPP political 
dominance throughout this period. In doing so, it contributes to emerging literature identifying 
the difficulties of sustaining competitive authoritarianism over time,5 and to our understanding 
 
1 Electoral Reform Alliance, Joint Report on the Conduct of the 2013 Election, Phnom Penh: 2013 
2 Caroline Hughes, “Understanding the Elections in Cambodia 2013 ." Aglos: Journal of Area-Based Global Studies, (2015): 1-20. 
3 Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, Politics, Propaganda and Violence in Cambodia During the UNTAC Era. (Boston: M.E. Sharpe, 1996) 
4 See for example: “Cambodia: Moving Away from Democracy?” International Political Science Review 32, no. 5 (2011): Sebastian Strangio, 
Hun Sen's Cambodia, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014); Lee Morgenbesser, Behind the Facade: Elections Under 
Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016). 
5 See for example: Christopher Carothers, “The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 29, 
no. 4 (2018): 129-135 




of the relationship between elite and mass patronage and coercion in systems of electoral 
authoritarianism, via a close exploration of its manifestations and conflicts in Cambodia. 
Concretely, this article highlights the underlying and persistent tensions in Cambodia’s 
clientelist politics and patronage relations since elections were reintroduced to popular acclaim 
by UN intervention in 1993. In so doing, it also shows the difficulties the CPP experienced in 
building and sustaining a mass-based party able to command popular support. This point was 
made in relation to communist-based revolutionary organizations by Brantley Womack in his 
classic study of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which had far different origins to 
Cambodia’s externally created and nurtured CPP,6 and today retains responsive, if repressive, 
state-society relations.7  
Scholarship has shown that broad-based and highly institutionalized parties capable of winning 
commanding electoral majorities arise only under very specific conditions and historical 
circumstances.8 This article reconceptualises the CPP to emphasise the particular obstacles – 
structural, institutional and distributional -- to building a mass-based clientelist party. It presents 
a critical re-examination of the CPP’s history and its development of elite and military 
patronage systems from the 1980s and 1990s and into the 2000s - the supposed zenith of the 
party’s electoral clientelism. The analysis instead points to a coercive core working in often 
contradictory ways to building genuine voter-clients over the same period. This approach 
emphasises the CPP’s lack of foundations as a socially embedded, legitimate organisation 
capable of delivering mass patronage to secure reliable electoral clientelism,9 particularly as 
compared to “paradigmatic” cases of dominant parties delivering electoral hegemony under 
competitive electoral authoritarianism, such as Malaysia.10  
The CPP’s weak social embedding is contrasted with its strong organisational capacity 
channelling state power in the form of coercion and facilitating the extraction of resources to 
its core members, particularly in the security forces. Repetitive elections did not work to 
 
6 Brantley Womack, “The Party and the People: Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Politics in China and Vietnam,” World Politics 39, no. 
4, 479-507; see also: Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way, “The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes” Journal of Democracy, 24 no. 3, 2013, p. 
5-17.  
7 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Governance, Development, and the Responsive–Repressive State in Vietnam,” Forum for Development Studies 
37, no. 1, 33. 
8 Dan Slater, Ordering Power : Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
9 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism  
10 William Case, “Electoral Authoritarianism in Malaysia: Trajectory Shift,” The Pacific Review 22, no. 3, (2009) 311. 




institutionalise mass patronage networks for successful electoral clientelism delivering more 
convincing competitive authoritarian elections over time.11 Rather, they served to further 
entrench and embed a coercive core of the regime ill-organised to build genuine reciprocity, 
but which has become increasingly cohesive and capable enough to manage the threats from 
below to the party and the networks of economic interests that have cemented its position in 
power, that boiled to the surface in 2013.  
To make its case, this article presents a critical examination of the politics of land dispossession 
in Cambodia. This relates to the appropriation by the state of large tracts of land previously 
occupied by farmers and urban dwellers leased to private business interests over the past three 
decades. Land has been shown to be vital to the way in which the CPP extended and 
strengthened its grip on Cambodia via the entrenchment of party-military-business alliances in 
the 1990s and 2000s.12 More recently, it has been suggested that the profits from predatory 
economic practices were used to boost the CPP electorally in the 2000s. What now seems to be 
the more enduring legacy is that the land dispossession that went hand in glove with the building 
of elite political alliances has also been key to its popular undoing electorally. Unlike in some 
countries where the military controls significant business interests on their own terms,13 what 
has emerged in Cambodia is a remarkably stable alliance between military enforcers and 
civilian capital entrepreneurs for the mutual exploitation of Cambodia’s resources and thereby 
of other economic opportunities.  
This article draws on fieldwork carried out between January-October 2017, supplemented by 
additional research trips July-September 2018 and November-December 2018. It is based on 
more than 50 semi-structured interviews conducted over this period, including 15 respondents 
directly cited in this article.14 People were interviewed for their expertise in the subject matter 
through their work or lived experience. Interviewees ranged in age from university students to 
retired former diplomats and were drawn from a variety of socio-economic groups and 
backgrounds, including farmers, civil servants, high-ranking military officials and economic 
tycoons. Interviews were conducted in Phnom Penh, Battambang, Siem Reap, and Preah 
 
11 For discussion of institutionalisation of competitive electoral authoritarianism see: Michael Bernhard, Amanda E. Edgell and Staffan I. 
Lindberg, “Institutionalising Electoral Uncertainty and Authoritarian Regime Survival,” European Journal of Political Research, 2019: 19 
12 Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991–2001, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003): 
13 Marcus Mietzner and Lisa Misol, “Military Businesses in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Decline, Reform and Persistence,” in The Politics of 
Military Reform, Editors, Jürgen Rüland, Maria-Gabriela Manea, Hans Born, (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 
14 All interviews were carried out in according with SOAS’ Research Ethics Policy available at: 
https://www.soas.ac.uk/research/ethics/file143594.pdfeni. 




Vihear. In addition to interviews, the article relies on reports released by the Cambodian 
government and its press units, and those of think tanks, international governmental 
organisations, civil society and other sources including online and print media. 
This article is structured as follows. The first section revisits existing explanations for CPP 
political survival in light of elections in 2013. It then reconsiders the architecture of the CPP in 
the context of its history as a repressive state apparatus imposed from above and with limited 
social embedding. It moves on to present evidence of its electoral illegitimacy before 2013 and 
after. In the second section, the focus on land shows that this organization has privileged the 
rapacious rewarding of its officials in the state and its military, which was its modus operando 
from the 1980s and remains the case today. The paper concludes that this predation provides an 
important window into understanding Cambodia’s current authoritarian path. 
 
Existing Explanations of Cambodia’s Politics 
 
Scholarship on Cambodia has emphasized elite patronage and electoral clientelism to explain 
the CPP’s political success.  This has been broadly captured under the banner of 
neopatrimonialism. Patronage is generally used to refer to both the exclusive allocation of 
resources to elite clients through often predatory practices such as the land grabbing, analysed 
in the second half of this article, and rewards and resources given to the general public in 
exchange for support of a political party at election time.15 This second stream follows Hicken’s 
definition of clientelism, a combination of particularistic targeting and as contingency-based 
reciprocal exchange through which the “chief criterion for receiving the targeted benefit is 
political support, typically voting.”16 Elite predation and clientelist distribution were seen as 
successfully complimentary strategies for CPP’s political survival. Conversely, this article 
emphasises the tensions inherent in such a system under competitive authoritarianism. 
 
Electoral patronage has been presented as both a modern phenomenon, and as reinforcing 
‘traditional’ rule in the modern context in analyses of Cambodia’s politics. In these latter 
accounts, patron-clientelism is presented as a proxy for neo-traditionalism. As a leading 
 
15 See for example: Kheang Un, and Sokbunthoeun So, “Land Rights in Cambodia: How Neopatrimonial Politics Restricts Land Policy 
Reform,” Pacific Affairs 84, no. 2 (2011): 289-308, 
16 Allen Hicken,” Clientelism,” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2007): 294. 




proponent of this view, Lee Morgenbesser presents modern day Cambodian politics as a 
continuation of the pre-colonial Southeast Asian state, in which power was personalised and 
society organised vertically from the King, through the nobility, downwards to the peasantry. 
Nowadays, “the division of power remains largely unchanged,” even if the actors populating 
its upper and middle levels, are different. 17 Elections become a means of reinforcing supposed 
historical roots of political power, and modern incarnations of traditional redistributive 
mechanisms tying clients to their patrons in seeming perpetuity.18 
 
Various studies have shown the limits to overly culturalist and selectively historicized accounts 
of patron-clientelism, including as applied to Cambodia. Early on, James Scott warned of 
making easy distinctions between “parochial” and European models of political authority by 
over-distinguishing between Asia and European practices of securing political office and 
favours prior to the mid-19th Century.19 Steve Heder’s work on the 2003 elections showed how 
modern elections in Cambodia have very little in common with classic depictions of Southeast 
Asian political values as conceptualised by classic scholars of the pre-colonial region.20 More 
critically for the case at hand is that Morgenbesser is essentializing Cambodian politics as a 
constant, which cannot explain the variance in political outcomes under investigation here. This 
is elsewhere implicitly identified by Morgenbesser himself in his analysis of Myanmar’s 
changing politics over time, when he removes historic patterns of patrimonialism as an 
independent variable in explaining its authoritarian political trajectory. He suggests “the onset 
of military rule created a schism” with Myanmar’s patrimonial tradition.21 Yet this is puzzlingly 
absent in his analysis of Cambodia despite the institution destroying Khmer Rouge and the 
institution-building Vietnamese in Cambodia’s own recent historical political development.  
 
Of the patronage-based accounts of Cambodian politics as a modern phenomenon, Kheang Un’s 
work has been the most influential, and it is widely cited, including by Morgenbesser. His focus 
on the CPP as elite and mass patronage broker comports with comparative work that places 
 
17 Morgenbesser, Behind the Façade, 51. 
18 Lee Morgenbesser, “The Failure of Democratisation by Elections in Cambodia,” Contemporary Politics, 23, no. 2, (2017): 135-155 
19 James C. Scott, “The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 11 no,3 (1969): 315-341. 
20 Steve Heder, “Political Theatre in the 2003 Cambodian Elections: State Democracy and Conciliation in Historical Perspective,” in Staging 
Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa, Julia Strauss and Donal. O’Brien, eds., (London: I.P. Taurus, 2007): 51–172. 
21 Morgenbesser, Behind the Façade, 133. 




emphasis on the function of political parties in authoritarian systems. In these accounts, parties 
play a dual function: they manage elite competition, and secure some measure of consent to be 
ruled from the masses.22 They are especially important in competitive authoritarian regimes 
because the incumbent retains power  through elections.23 
 
In Un’s view, the CPP has effectively combined electoral clientelism and elite patronage for 
delivering CPP electoral hegemony, situating both in a broader context of performance 
legitimacy achieved via high GDP growth rates, and contributing to relative political stability 
under the CPP since the 2000s. He describes a system in which wealth accumulated by 
economic elites is instrumentalised by the CPP to carry out development projects to secure its 
electoral dominance: “Hun Sen/CPP have transformed patron–client ties by linking state/party 
elites to economic elites and then to voters to bolster their electoral victories and legitimacy and 
thus further strengthen their control of the country.”24 
 
However, the election in 2013 showed that the CPP’s mass patronage had not bought it the 
electoral clients it thought it had, with voters rejecting the terms of the offered clientelist deal 
and ongoing recognition of their place in it.25 Astrid Norén-Nilsson’s study into electoral 
clientelism in 2013 showed that while Cambodian voters were happy to take patronage and 
other gifts from the CPP, they did not reciprocate with votes, and instead were more likely to 
question the legitimacy of the giver based on perceptions of inequality and dissatisfaction with 
the political status quo.26 The CPP was not the effective patronage distributor bringing in a 
steady electoral clients previously suggested in the dominant literatures in Cambodian politics.  
 
A fuller explanation of Cambodia’s politics that attends to the electoral threat in 2013, and the 
CPP’s abandonment of competition altogether in 2018, can be found by reconsidering the 
tensions in the CPP’s mass and elite patronage systems, and what this reveals more broadly 
about the CPP and the loci of political power in Cambodia. This pays attention to the 
 
22 Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism” The Annual Review of Political Science 12: 403-422 
23 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 63 
24 Un, “Cambodia: moving Away from Democracy?” 548. 
25 See Hicken, “Clientelism.” 
26 Astrid Norén-Nilsson, “Good Gifts, Bad Gifts, and Rights: Cambodian Popular Perceptions and the 2013 Elections,” Pacific Affairs 89, no. 
4 (2016): 795-815. 




fundamental dilemma’s facing authoritarian leaders in managing their political constituencies 
and its implications under competitive authoritarianism. Milan Svolik’s work on the twin 
pressures facing authoritarian leaders is important in this regard. He suggests that dictators can 
never be sure of their position and must constantly strive to maintain their security.27 He shows 
that two fundamental imperatives shape the political calculations of leaders under 
authoritarianism: protecting oneself against threats from below, and the need to placate elite 
allies within the ruling coalition. This dictates how patronage is allocated within the regime, 
the use of repression and ultimately the survival of the leader.  
 
This paper considers this in relation to Cambodia’s election in 2013 and subsequent 
abandonment of competitive authoritarianism. The following argument points to a new analysis 
of the CPP as an institution, historically and presently organised for the purpose of supressing 
dissent and rewarding its elite supporters, rather than coopting an electorate from below that is 
traditionally ambivalent to its legitimacy and that, unlike the military, has never been 
fundamental to its survival.  
 
Organizational Impediments to Mass Party-Building and the CPP’s Repressive Core 
 
Political parties under competitive electoral authoritarianism are most successful in obtaining 
consent from the masses when they have a legitimate basis in society. In Malaysia, until recently 
an exemplary case of dominant party hegemony under competitive electoral authoritarianism, 
the UMNO was extraordinarily successful in winning elections because it institutionalised as a 
broad-based party in a cross-class coalition.28 In such cases of “strongly institutionalised” 
parties, they reach “deeply into society and nest within dense networks of both intra-party and 
external organisations.” 29   
 
In contrast, the CPP was formed under Vietnamese protection in 1979 to be the core political 
organization inside the administration and armed forces of the newly-founded People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime that was to administer Cambodia during its occupation 
 
27 Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
28  Slater, Ordering Power. 
29 Meredith L. Weiss, “Coalitions and Competition in Malaysia – Incremental Transformation of a Strong-party System,” Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 32, no. 2, (2013): 19. 




in the 1980s, and its electoral vehicle to legitimate the Vietnamese occupation in uncontested 
elections.30 The Pol Pot-led Communist Party of Kampuchea regime it replaced, from whose 
lower and defecting ranks many of the PRK’s senior and other officials were drawn, had been 
responsible for some of the most egregious violence of the 20th century and had purposely set 
out to clean the slate of the ancien régime.  
 
The PRK was thus made up of officials who had neither a pre-existing socially legitimate basis 
for power nor an embedding in ongoing political structures, the Pol Pot regime having collapsed 
when the Vietnamese had invaded.31 The regime was built from the top down, operating what 
was essentially a “police state” throughout the decade.32 This included a large first Vietnamese 
and later Cambodian military necessary to deter the remnants of the old regimes displaced by 
the Vietnamese and encamped on the border through the 1980s. Together this created something 
akin to a birth defect for building genuine reciprocal relationships with voters, institutionally 
ill-equipped to build a genuinely mass-based socially nested political organisation, but tied to 
each other through the need to maintain their position within the state and endowing it with a 
strong coercive capacity that has remained its most fundamental resource. 
 
After the Vietnamese military almost entirely left in 1989, the PRK’s large state apparatus and 
formidable armed forces were the base out of which the CPP operated to contest democratic 
elections organised by the UN in 1993.33 This proved an effective basis for remaining in power 
against the significant electoral threat of FUNCINPEC, the party of the former King Sihanouk. 
In this way the CPP was able to defeat the political opposition via “propaganda, politics and 
violence” in 1993,34 and again in 1998 following a brutal coup de force.  
 
However, by the mid-2000s, the CPP was apparently changing tack by looking to build electoral 
legitimacy “to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of rural voters and to undercut competition from 
opposition parties.” This was seen as “the beginning of the development of mass patronage 
 
30 Evan Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside The Politics Of Nation Building, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2002). 
31 Margaret Slocomb, The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution After Pol Pot, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004). 
32 Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: Chea Sim Death Shows Failings of Khmer Rouge Court” 08 June 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/cambodia-chea-sim-death-shows-failings-khmer-rouge-court. 
33 UNTAC Information/Education Division, The Takeo Papers, (1993); The Prey Veng Papers (1993). 
34 Heder and Ledgerwood, Politics 




electoral politics” as the CPP was portrayed as having learned that “coercion, intimidation, 
and violence did not constitute a foundation for permanent strength.”35 The CPP won big in 
elections in 2008 characterized by significantly less political violence than previously, 
seemingly confirming its winning shift from coercion to mass patronage electoral politics.  
 
However, recent analysis of voting patterns by Caroline Hughes has shown that, at the national 
level, the CPP’s vote share has remained fairly static since the 1993 elections, casting serious 
doubt on the notion that there was a growing post-UNTAC efficacy of CPP mass electoral 
clientelism.36 I suggest too little attention was paid to the fact that this was a triumph over the 
remnants of what had been reduced to a divided and intimidated opposition, even if the 
opposition’s damaged situation was recognized as having already been a vital fact of political 
life in the elections of 1998. FUNCINPEC never recovered from the CPP coup de force, which 
had decapitated it militarily and hastened its decline as a political entity.37 It eventually 
collapsed in on itself in 2004,38 competing as two separate parties in 2008.  
 
This left the relatively new Sam Rainsy Party and the much newer Human Rights Party, led by 
Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha respectively, as the most viable, but still divided, opposition 
parties. However, Sam Rainsy had been in exile most of the years between 2005 and 2008, 
while Kem Sokha had been targeted by the government and imprisoned in 2005. Analyses of 
the CPP’s victory in 2008 also underplayed the extent to which those elections saw the same 
patterns of “coercion, intimidation and violence” as previous elections, if on a smaller scale, 
and were carried out in an atmosphere in which earlier violence was still reverberating.39 Behind 
gradually decreasing but still evident instances of electoral violence,40 throughout this period 
Cambodia’s Freedom House rating remained “Not Free,” scoring 5.5/7 (1 being the best, 7 the 
worst) for their Freedom Rating, and 5/7 for Civil Liberties and 6/7 for political rights, in every 
year from 2003 to 2019.41  
 
35 Kheang Un, Cambodia: Return to Authoritarianism, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019), 30. 
36 Caroline Hughes, “Understanding the Elections in Cambodia 2013 ." Aglos: Journal of Area-Based Global Studies, (2015): 1-20. 
37 Brad Adams,  “Cambodia: July 1997: Shock and Aftermath.” 27 July 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/27/cambodia-july-1997-
shock-and-aftermath. 
38 Steve Heder, “Hun Sen's Consolidation: Death or the Beginning of Reform?” Southeast Asian Affairs 113–130. 
39 HRW, “Cambodia: Threats and Intimidation Mar Campaign,” 26 July 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/07/26/cambodia-threats-
intimidation-mar-campaign 
40 Information on electoral violence 1993-2019 available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/ 
41 Information available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia 





Thus, the emerging scholarly consensus on the CPP as a hearts-and-minds-winning juggernaut 
was overblown. That juggernaut remained anchored in the same repressive state bureaucratic 
apparatus, including the military that had been attempting to consolidate its post-Vietnamese 
rule since the late 1980s via “the exploitation and marginalization of the poor.”42  
 
From the early 1990s, CPP officials tasked with delivering patronage and thus votes were 
operating – as they do to this day -- as part of a top-down system for ordering power and the 
regime remained organised around its capacity to coerce voters and exploit Cambodia’s natural 
resources. Central to this operation are Party Working Groups (PWGs), historically a PRK 
mechanism for centralised control at the local level.43 These were of limited political utility for 
gaining popularity and reflect the relative electoral weaknesses Scott noted of a “party that has 
created its own network of patron-client linkages from the center” when compared to those 
which rely “on preexisting patron-client bonds and merely incorporates them into its 
organization.”44 PWGs are populated by officials in institutions whose legitimacy among the 
public was highly dubious given the PRK’s weak and corrupt practices in terms of service 
delivery, relative to its repressive core, a system that is still widely perceived as corrupt and 
self-interested.  
 
As Wintrobe notes, such institutions in authoritarian regimes are ill-equipped to effectively 
convey the true level of support of the leadership, reliant as they are on coercion.45 In the 
absence of a credible elections in 2008 to gauge support, I would suggest this played no small 
part in the apparent failure by the CPP leadership to appreciate the depth of antagonism toward 
them going into elections in 2013. Thus the CPP went into elections in 2013 with imperfect 
information, perhaps explaining why Hun Sen took such a laissez-faire approach to 
campaigning, and allowed Sam Rainsy to return to Cambodia the week before elections were 
scheduled in 2013, riding a wave of support that greeted him at the airport and built in the days 
preceding the election.  
 
 
42 Caroline Hughes, Cambodia’s Transition, 59. 
43 This point was made to the author by Steve Heder. 
44 Scott, “Patron-client Politics,” 111. 
45 Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 20. 




It also suggest why the CPP only sought to address land grabbing in late 2012, at a point when 
it was too little, too late for hundreds of thousands of Cambodians whose land had been often 
violently confiscated, and which was a lightning rod for CNRP support. In an interview in 2018, 
Hun Sen expressed his biggest regret in reference to land grabbing, and acknowledged his 
inability to get a handle on it: “we caused more land disputes because we could not control the 
situation with our lower-level officials.”46 However, as argued in the latter section of this article, 
these disputes were the result of the appetites of far more than greedy lower-level officials. 
 
An early argument that the CPP’s electoral system was ineffectual at winning real electoral 
legitimacy was presented by Hughes in her analysis of the elections in 2003. She suggested that 
clientelistic practices were devoid of legitimacy, instead reflecting the massive concentration 
of particularly coercive power in the hands of the CPP in the state.47 Heder similarly maintained 
early on that elections were a “performance” to which the electorate was supposed to cheer in 
the face of the state’s massive bureacratic and coercive might, rather than willfully participate 
in or reflecting the genuine will of the people.48   
 
This reality was a poor foundation for genuine vote-winning reciprocity but has proven a strong 
one for the entrenchment of repressive governance by CPP-state administrators, including those 
drawn from the military, who have privileged their own interests over those of the rural 
population on whose votes they were supposed to increasingly depend for legitimacy.  
 
The Hollowness of the CPP as Competitive Electoral Vehicle 
 
Alongside historic institutional impediments to building a robust electoral machine, this 
structure has been reproduced in Cambodia’s political economy. It has entrenched asymmetries 
of wealth and power that privilege repression over reform, violence over redistribution, and 
elite cohesion over fragmentation. To a large extent ordinary Cambodians have been excluded 
from reaping the economic benefits of CPP rule, instead expected to be content with abstract 
GDP growth rates while witnessing the pervasiveness of corruption that sustains it in their 
 
46 Sun Narin, “Hun Sen’s Biggest Regrets: Land Disputes,” VOA, 18 July 2018.  
47 Caroline Hughes, “The Politics of Gifts: Tradition and Regimentation in Contemporary Cambodia,” The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 
37 no, 3 (2006): 469-489 
48 Heder, “Political Theatre.” 




everyday lives. This was pointed out to me during various interviews with officials and villagers 
in Cambodia in 2017 and 2018. It was also reflected in internal CPP polling in 2016.49  
 
A senior Cambodian election monitor described the “cronyism” of the ruling “cluster,” drawing 
attention to how the economic inequities created under the CPP’s economic system have been 
rejected by the electorate, while suggesting that the returning of votes for patronage has been 
as much about coercion as reciprocity.  
 
You can see the family in the past the parent [the CPP] always give money and the 
children [the people] obey but this time the parents give money to the children, but the 
children not obey as before... They argue with the parents, so the parents now try to 
understand what happened, why they not able to control their children. Some [argue] 
they lack discipline, [it’s a] weakness of education, that why the children not follow the 
parent. But I don’t think so. The reason... [is] the economic activity... [It] reflects the 
way the patronage systems of the party [to] give money is not effective.50   
 
A former senior advisor to the Royal Government of Cambodia put it more bluntly, reflecting 
the politically counter-productive nature of a patronage system that gives a little with one hand, 
but takes enormously with the other: “When people need something, they [the CPP] set up a lot 
of mechanism for the nation… it’s like humanitarianism inside your own country. But it’s not 
going to work… The people are not stupid!” This, he continued, was not least because elite 
benefits were being doled out in such a way as to seriously undermine the mass patronage 
system: “you can still have villas, luxury cars, children in private school and so on, it’s OK, as 
long as the majority of the people, you don’t grab their land [without] allowing them to have a 
minimum of things.”51   
 
This has intersected with and contributed to the CPP’s inability to get a handle on new, young, 
voters who entered the electoral market for the first time in 2013. Many were instead captured 
by the CNRP. Approximately 1.5 million young Cambodians voted for the first time in 2013, 
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and were turned off by a CPP platform defined in terms of its claim of having saved 
Cambodia.52 As opposition Sam Rainsy plausibly explained it to me: 
 
There are more and more young people who are more informed, more organised, more 
critical, more demanding... People are more educated…Even though people remain very 
poor, when they come to the cities they are not starving anymore. They do any job to 
survive but the fact that they are even slightly better off; they are less subject to vote 
buying.53 
 
The CNRP’s positive platform was amplified by new means of communication. In 2016, 48% 
of Cambodian claimed to have access to the Internet or Facebook, and more people accessed 
information online (30%) than TV (29%) and radio (15%).54 According to the 2016 polling 
data, 54% of voters who got their information from Facebook said they would vote for the 
CNRP in elections in 2018, as compared 20% of Facebook informed voters who said they would 
choose the CPP.  
 
Dissatisfaction at state predation over land and resources, harm to the environment and official 
corruption was widespread. This was reflected in CPP polling post 2013 and relayed to me in 
interviews I conducted with villagers around the time of the national election in 2018. As one 
person put it, reflecting on the inequalities of CPP patronage it: “During… development we 
suffer difficulties... The poor get poorer and the richer get richer. So, most of our people live in 
poverty, especially farmers in the countryside.”55 A further interviewee explained that there is 
very little possibility to complain, and that complaints are ignored by officials who act only in 
their own interest.56 In such views, party officials are not seen to reciprocate for the demands 
they placed on villagers. Thus, the demands lack contingency central to clientelist politics. 
Villagers complained that the CPP seeks contributions from families when they need money, 
but the family cannot expect help in return if there is a problem and may actually be 
discriminated against if they are thought to support the opposition. Another person interviewed 
likened the local situation to increased repression at the national level, and that they risked 
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losing their job if they complained, and would “get into trouble” if they raised criticisms, facing 
risks “like Kem Ley,”57 the murdered analyst and government critic who was gunned down in 
Phnom Penh in 2016.  
 
However, perhaps the strongest evidence of the extent to which the CPP mass patronage system 
was fundamentally weak as an electoral strategy at the local level was made clear in commune 
elections in 2017, when the CNRP built on its vote share in the 2013 national elections to make 
serious inroads into rural areas the CPP had dominated for decades.58 
 
The apparently genuine choice the CNRP represented galvanized this dissatisfaction into a 
public challenge via the ballot box, and in such a way as to bring the distinction between CPP’s 
patron-client systems more sharply into focus. The mass patronage electoral system was far less 
reciprocal, and far less contingent on benefits for votes, than has previously been assumed. In 
contrast, the intra-elite system held and continued to be able to employ coercive practices 
proving sufficient to the task of dealing with the threat of an effective opposition by doing away 
with it, often violently. That this was the case is not surprising if we turn to consider the real 
beneficiaries of the CPP’s patronage: itself and its security apparatus.  
 
The CPP’s Predatory Patronage: A Military-Eye View from the Land 
 
A deadly three-day assault launched against anti-government protesters in Phnom Penh in 
January 2014 signalled that political violence remained a critical part of the CPP’s electoral 
repertoire a decade after it was supposed to have faded from view. It was carried out by a mixed 
force of RCAF units, including specialist paramilitary forces, gendarmes and intervention units, 
taking order from a mixed command of local and national CPP officials in government.59  
 
The politicisation of Cambodia’s security forces stems from their creation under the Vietnamese 
in the 1980s, as documented in an internal CPP history released in 2015.60 It remains politicised 
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today. Openly reflecting the military role at the top of the party, in 2013 and 2018, the then 
topmost RCAF Generals Pol Sarouen, Kun Kim and Meas Sophea coordinated the election 
machines and centre-level work teams in Preah Sihanouk, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear 
provinces respectively. In each case these men were tasked to head the CPP election apparatus, 
running at the head of the party ticket for seats in the National Assembly, before standing down 
and ceding the seats to a civilian.61 
 
As a senior Brigadier General explained the symbiosis of the CPP and the military in 2017 in 
an interview with me: 
 
 The military tend to see themselves as the backbone of society. The one who maintain 
 order… [Military people] still identify themselves as within the party. [They] see no 
 contradiction. Officially you don’t talk about the party as the same thing as the country. 
 But unofficially, it’s still there.62  
 
This has an economic dimension that is central to understanding why the armed forces have 
proved capable and willing to suppress anti-regime dissent whenever deemed necessary.63 
Deputy Commander of the RCAF and Commander of the Gendarmerie Royale Khmer (GRK) 
Sao Sokha made this point to me in 2017: his forces “must maintain stability and order in order 
to make possible investment and economic wellbeing for the country.”64 Bellin has argued that 
militaries which operate along lines of patronage have a strong material interest in maintaining 
stability against popular pressures and when reform may be ruinous.65 In Cambodia the RCAF 
works alongside the state bureaucracy to continue to exploit and marginalize the poor, widening 
the gap between the recipients of elite and mass patronage, much to the benefit of the former 
against the interests of the latter.  
 
 
61 Author’s list of CPP Central Committee Centre-level work teams from 2013.   
62 Author interview with RCAF Brigadier General, Phnom Penh, 27 February 2017. 
63 Neil Loughlin, “Authoritarian Regime Durability: An Analysis of Cambodia’s Coercion-Dominant Winning Coalition,” PhD Dissertation, 
SOAS, 2005, 1-360  
64 Author interview with General Sao Sokha, Deputy Head of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and Commander of the 
Gendarmerie Royale Khmer (GRK), Phnom Penh, 17 February 2017 
65 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 
36 no, 2 (2004): 139-157. 




Land disputes in Cambodia are a critical site in which this CPP-state-military cooperation may 
be understood. It is a realm in which there is a degree of reciprocity, contingency and iteration 
by contrast evidently lacking in the CPP’s electoral patronage.  As one senior NGO worker put 
it:  
Land is just the distribution of wealth from pillaging Cambodia’s natural resources. 
Cambodia is seen by the elite as a big pie for them to eat. Each has a role. The security 
forces do the security. The tycoons do the selling. The party does the rule of law and the 
paperwork.66 
 
Cambodia’s land grabbing epidemic went into overdrive once the opposition had collapsed as 
an electoral force from 2004, precisely during the same period the CPP was supposed to be 
securing its hold on power via mass electoral clientelism. The rights group LICADHO reported 
an enormous increase in the number of land dispossession cases it was monitoring from 2003, 
with 25 in 2003 to 112 in 2004 and 126 in 2005.67 Large swathes were made commercially 
available to local tycoons and international investors, often operating with local partners.68  
 
Particularly significant in the period when the CPP was supposedly cementing its legitimacy 
via mass patronage were exclusionary Economic Land Concessions (ELCs). These are long-
term leases of state land that allowed beneficiaries to clear land in order to develop industrial 
agriculture.  According to one estimate they affected up to 700,000 Cambodians between 2003 
and 2013.69 Official data on these concessions is incomplete.  However numbers compiled by 
the UN’s Special Rapporteur on human rights noted a steady increase between 2004 and 2012, 
with a total of 320 ELCs in 21 provinces including Phnom Penh, granted to foreign and local 
companies by 2012.70 It is estimated that by the election that year an area equivalent of up to 
50% of Cambodia’s arable land had been allocated to ELCs, with as much as 30% of that land 
owned by 1% of its population.71  
 
 
66 Author interview with senior human rights monitor 1, m, Phnom Penh, January 20, 2017. 
67 LICADHO, “Human Rights in Cambodia: The Façade of Stability,” 3 May 2006, 3,  
68 ADHOC, “Cambodia: A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resource Rights in Cambodia in 2012,” (Phnom Penh, 2013). 
69 ADHOC, “Land Situation in Cambodia in 2013,” (Phnom Penh, 2014). 
70 Surya P. Subedi , “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human rRghts in Cambodia,” 24 September 2012. 
 
71 Andreas Neef, Siphat. Touch and Jamaree Chiengthong (2013) “The Politics and Ethics of Land Concessions in Rural Cambodia”, Journal 
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 26(6): 1085–1103 




On paper, a number of avenues exist to settle disputes in Cambodia.  However as observed by 
rights groups ADHOC “formal conflict resolution processes and institutions are often put aside 
or do not play their role.”72 In 2012 less than 30 per cent of complaints filed to the government’s 
own National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR) were resolved. 73 Even when 
communities could claim to have farmed land for decades, this was difficult to prove and even 
harder to uphold through the courts, where rulings regularly went in favour of the wealthiest 
and most politically connected parties to the dispute: tycoons supported by local and national 
level CPP officials, whose land was cleared and then policed by the security forces to prevent 
evicted communities from returning.74  
 
The security forces are the ultimate guarantee of the CPP’s predatory behaviour as both 
beneficiaries and enforcers on behalf of other beneficiaries. Large-scale land concessions meant 
the CPP was able to maintain a large coercive apparatus supportive of it, despite calls for 
demobilization,75 as elements in the CPP and tycoons plundered the state with their help. In 
2002, RCAF soldiers could expect to earn around $20 and be granted 20 kilos of rice a month. 
Unable to live on that amount, soldiers supplemented their incomes with second jobs, “sub-
contracted out” by their commanders.76 A 2000 government Defence White Paper spoke of 
“allowing soldiers to cooperate with investment units in the agro-industrial field.”77 This model 
has been re-affirmed in subsequent defence reviews and its on-going relevance confirmed to 
me by a veteran observer of RCAF.78  
According to World Bank (2018b) figures military expenditure as a percentage of government 
expenditure reached around $370 million in 2016. At the same time military numbers have 
stabilized at around 192,000 since 2002.79 A simple calculation demonstrates the official budget 
would just cover a basic salary of around $160 a month per soldier, not dependent on rank, with 
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nothing leftover to purchase or maintain equipment, military bases or other items necessary to 
maintain a functional army.80 The official figures thus reveal the extent to which off-budget 
financing and sponsorship deals remain vital to military coffers. 
The military’s involvement in land grabs represents the sharp end of businesses that provide 
great benefit to high-ranking military commanders who operate in collusion with tycoons 
protected by the CPP state, but who also are thereby able to act as patrons to their armed soldier 
clients. Since 2010, military and business links previously only discernible through violent 
evictions have been joined by direct sponsorship deals, symbolized by the signing of the 
Decision on Restructuring between Army Units, National Police and Civil Bodies in February 
2010.81 This was initially heralded as a measure to reinforce border defences in connection with 
briefly violent territorial disputes with Thailand and to provide welfare to units. However, for 
ordinary people,  this relationship was described to me in an interview with a senior human 
rights monitor as “very, very dangerous” because of the potential for “severe conflicts of 
interest.”82 This has been manifest in practice as military units directly sponsored by tycoons 
have participated in land dispossessions on their concessions.  
Another senior human rights monitor working on the land rights cases noted the continued 
mutual benefits involved in such practices and their negative impact on the state coffers and its 
resource management:  
 
The connection between military and business is most clear at the border. For example, 
in Preah Vihear during the war. The military made alliances with business, who 
provided them food, supplies and other things. In return for the alliance the businessman 
is untouchable. [The businessman] does not even need to pay taxes as they give money 
to the state… to the military! The businessmen get a great deal. The tycoons send cheap 
food. But get back that and more from timber, mining etc.83 
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Since the 2010, cooperation has grown to more than 100 sponsorship deals, according to Hun 
Manet, the son of the Prime Minister.84 At a ceremony in 2015 Tea Banh lauded ten years of 
such cooperation, declaring it represented “a culture of sharing and contributing to our nation, 
between civil institutions and RCAF.”85 The deals read like a who’s who of CPP-dependent 
tycoons with track records of involvement in land disputes and linked to illegal logging activity 
in Cambodia.   
 
It presents a possibility to keep soldiers close economically to their commanders who, working 
in tandem with civilian tycoons, continue to provide them with resources and jobs on the land 
as both farmers and as useful enforcers should situations arise deemed to require violence 
against those supposedly threatening Cambodia’s “stability.” As a senior human rights monitor 
commented on the situation now, “it’s collusion between military, political and economic power 
where people are vying for privilege, all equipped with all three components.”86 Land- and other 
resource grabs have turned security force commanders into businessmen in their own right and 
their soldiers into workforces for hire. This has created a mutually beneficial economic 
relationship within the CPP state among military operators and other businesspersons against 
much of the electorate, and thus mutual economic incentives to use soldiers for violent 
repression against anti-regime mobilisation.87 A foreign military analyst who has who recently 
discussed RCAF with me concluded: 
The military guys are big economic players on the level of Oknhas.88 They’re involved 
in everything. These RCAF guys aren’t getting their money from their salaries, which 
is low even for ranking officers. Money comes from the business deals. And the tycoons 
benefit as a link to somebody in the RCAF. It gives you an advantage over your business 
competitors... In the 1990s the game was to win the war. Now the game isn’t military, 
it’s the economic game.89 
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Among the most notorious of sponsors is CPP Senator and tycoon Ly Yong Phat, whose land 
grabs in his original provincial base of Koh Kong illustrated a foundational parallelism of the 
CPP’s patronage systems indicative of other party-military-business relationships, through 
which elites have been rewarded enormously at the expense of rural communities. 
 
Ly Yong Phat, known as “the King of Koh Kong,” got his start in cross-border trading from the 
l980s.90 At this time Cambodia provided an important land bridge to bring goods to Vietnam 
from Thailand. Business along this border was linked to smuggling activities, which continued 
through UNTAC times into the present. In the 1990s and early 2000s Ly Yong Phat invested 
his capital in a number of hotels, including the upmarket Phnom Penh Hotel, which opened in 
2003.  He became a crucial player in Cambodia’s land sector in the mid-2000s, as Cambodia’s 
ELC-granting process went through the roof. The payoff in terms of land acquisition has been 
enormous. According to a 2012 report released by Cambodian rights group LICADHO and The 
Cambodia Daily, Ly Yong Phat held an interest in 10 sugar and rubber plantations and a Special 
Economic Zone, spanning 86,000 hectares and making up roughly 4.3% of land concessions 
nationwide.91 Although notorious for sugar, he is a leading player across Cambodia’s 
agricultural sector. His Chub rubber concession in Kampong Cham is Cambodia’s largest at 
17,720 hectares, accounting for approximately 10% of the country’s rubber output, churning 
out around 40 tonnes a day. 
 
Ly Yong Phat has sponsored military units in tandem with ministries implicated in his business 
interests and helping to tie soldiers to their units. One example involves the state Electricité du 
Cambodge (EdC), which is linked to Ly Yong Phat’s casino along the border with Thailand in 
Military Region 4, where he sponsors Infantry Brigade 42.92 Cambodia’s state electricity giant 
has a contract to buy electricity from Ly Yong Phat’s Cambodia Electricity Private (CEP) for 
18 years.93  According to the military analyst, in Military Region 4, “there are hundreds of 
military resettlement houses all in a row. Sponsored by EdC [and] linked to 42 Brigade …. 
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These houses cost $4000 a pop.”94 His Phnom Penh Sugar Co. ltd operating in Kampong Speu 
province is linked to Battalion 313 based in the South-western Military Region 3, which 
encompasses Koh Kong and Ly Yong Phat’s sugar concessions there.95 The unit is made up of 
former Khmer Rouge integrated into the RCAF in the late 1990s, with a long history of 
involvement in illegal logging and other business activities.96  
 
The political utility and popular disutility of such state, military and tycoon connections is 
evident in the use of violence by the armed units Ly Yong Phat sponsors in the service of his 
economic interests.  In October 2009, a contingent of approximately 150 police, military police, 
and hired demolition workers burned and razed the houses of around 118 families. RCAF troops 
from Brigade 42 set up roadblocks and aided in the burning and bulldozing of the village. The 
villagers were never allowed to return to their homes. 97  
Ly Yong Phat’s concessions also provide an example of the ways in which triumphant and 
deeply interwoven CPP state-military and tycoon elites have succeeded in utilising their grip 
on power to expropriate private goods from the poor and concentrate wealth in their own hands. 
By the time of elections in 2013, ELCs made up an area of 2.6 million hectares, equalling more 
than 10% of the entire country.98 This is over three times the area of land allocated as 
agricultural concessions by 2003. Just five CPP Senators own 20% of all this land. Like Ly 
Yong Phat, these civilians made their fortunes in the 1990s in crony capitalist with the CPP. 99  
 
On the other hand, smallholders on land taken for concessions have become day labourers on 
the land they once farmed as their own. Ly Yong Phat’s notoriety made him an emblematic 
target for the CNRP rallying cries: “Ly Yong Phat! I tell you that you cannot live in happiness 
for the rest of your life. Ly Yong Phat, you have mistreated people in Koh Kong province. Ly 
Yong Phat, be careful!”100  
 
It is little surprise therefore that land was still one of the key sites of contention in the election 
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in 2013. Across the country CPP land grabs had represented the “bad news” of central 
government policies and practices contrary to local needs.101 This bad news of land grabs, more 
easily disseminated via social media and other channels than ever before, had become 
widespread and often directly felt by villagers. Rights groups had sensitized communities of 
their rights with regard to land disputes, while national and eventually international media 
publicity of abuses encouraged them to assert these rights. The overall effect was the CPP had 
undermined its legitimacy to such an extent as to significantly negate attempts to build it at the 
grassroots.  
Perhaps cognizant of the deep unpopularity of ELCs and with much of Cambodia’s somehow 
exploitable land already privatized to the benefit of the regime, Hun Sen announced a 
Moratorium of the Granting of ELCs in May 2012, coupled with a student-led land-titling 
scheme for rural farmers, the year before the 2013 election. However, the moratorium was 
deeply flawed and was enacted in such a way as to reinforce repression as central to CPP rule.102 
It highlighted the extent to which the CPP’s most fundamental patronage system was that which 
benefitted its elite supporters, and the pre-eminent need to keep feeding the security forces at 
the core of the regime. This had kept it in power since 1993 in the face of previous crises and 
would prove to do so again in the post 2013 crackdown. 
In the days and weeks following the result in elections in 2013, the CNRP was able to muster 
large number of protesters, especially in Phnom Penh, to take to the streets. If the result of the 
2013 election should not have been so unexpected to the CPP and various observers, given the 
weakness of their electoral clientelism, the subsequent violent crackdown and repression of the 
opposition was, and perfectly so. The repressive apparatus had benefitted enormously from the 
conditions that spurred the electoral and street challenges to the regime. The violent crackdowns 
in the streets and squares of Phnom Penh in early 2014 paved the way for further repression 
that followed, enacted by elements within the CPP state that had, like the military, benefited 
enormously from the spoils of corruption of which land grabbing is emblematic. 103  The upshot 
was the re-modelling of Cambodia’s electoral landscape by dissolving the CNRP and holding 
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elections with no competitors able to challenge the CPP in 2018, following the exile of Sam 
Rainsy, the arrest of Kem Sokha, and the dissolution of the CNRP by the CPP-controlled courts. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper re-evaluated previous analyses of Cambodian politics that have sought to explain 
the CPP regime’s longevity in terms of mass patronage and performance legitimacy recruiting 
voter-clients to secure electoral hegemony. It demonstrated that the CPP lacked the societal 
embedding necessary to build a successful mass party to maintain power under competitive 
authoritarianism over the long term, while coercion has remained its constant and underlying 
foundation for survival. It explained the symbiosis of the CPP with the coercive apparatus of 
state in historical and institutional terms, and  provided evidence to show how state, military 
and economic elites have benefitted from patronage at the direct expense of large swathes of 
the electorate, with land grabs emblematic of the “bad news” of government policy. In the face 
of a resurgent opposition in 2013, the regime’s survival was guaranteed via the repression by a 
security apparatus deeply embedded in its extractive political economy, and who have been 
among the main beneficiaries of the land boom, working together with capitalist entrepreneurs 
whose business interests developed under the protection of, and dependent on, the CPP and its 
military. 
 
Instead of addressing that malcontent, the regime has focused its collective might on repressing 
it. Their actions since have demonstrated the difficulties in a system of elite and mass patronage 
that created an enormously unbalanced system for political survival and reflected the tensions 
in simultaneously managing vertical and horizontal threats to its power. This produced a system 
of hollowness in the reciprocity between the CPP as patron and rural Cambodians as election 
time clients. This relationship was not iterative, but compelled, and was exposed as such when 
a genuine challenger appeared behind which voters could throw their support, in the hope of 
better benefits in the future.   
 
As previous scholarship has showed, building a highly institutionalised, mass-based party is 
difficult, and arises under only certain historic and other conditions. These conditions were 
absent in Cambodia from the start. Herein lies the explanation for an open return to coercive 
form. The regime born out of repression, which was embedded over time within the institutional 
structures of the state. The result is that coercion remains fundamental and operates against the 




interests of much of the voting public. This suggests that the CPP’s attempts to win hearts and 
minds only appeared to work when there was no credible opposition, as happened temporarily 
in 2008 as a culmination of previous violence. Seen this way there was no “return to coercion.” 
It never really went away and still is the key to keeping opposition at bay. 
 
 
 
